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Costs of Climate Mitigation Policies 
Y.-H. Henry Chen, Mustafa Babiker, Sergey Paltsev, John Reilly 
Abstract 
The wide range of cost estimates for stabilizing climate is puzzling to policy makers as well as 
researchers. Assumptions about technology costs have been studied extensively as one reason for these 
differences. Here, we focus on how policy timing and the modeling of economy-wide interactions affect 
costs. We examine these issues by restructuring a general equilibrium model of the global economy, 
removing elements of the model one by one. We find that delaying the start of a global policy by 20 
years triples the needed starting carbon price and increases the macroeconomic cost by nearly 30%. 
We further find that including realistic details of the economy (e.g. sectoral and electricity technology 
detail; tax and trade distortions; capital vintaging) more than double net present discounted costs over 
the century. Inter-model comparisons of stabilization costs find a similar range, but it is not possible to 
isolate the structural causes behind cost differences. Broader comparisons of stabilization costs face 
the additional issue that studies of different vintages assume different policy starting dates, often dates 
that are no longer realistic given the pace of climate change negotiations. This study can aid in 
interpretation of estimates and give policymakers and researchers an idea of how to adjust costs 
upwards as the start of policy is delayed. It also illustrates that models that greatly simplify the realities 
of modern economies likely underestimate costs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a serious concern that poses major risks, both for economic well-being and 
for the natural ecosystems on which we depend (IPCC, 2014). There is little question that the 
efforts to reduce emissions should be strengthened, but at what cost? The Stern Review (Stern, 
2007) reasoned that the cost of stabilization at 500–550 ppm of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2-eq) was annually about 1% of Gross World Product (GWP) looking out to the year 2050, 
and damages of unabated climate change would require as much as a present-value 20% 
reduction (on average) in consumption per person worldwide. Comparing those benefits to 
mitigation costs made a strong case for rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, with little reason 
to even consider further mitigation costs. 
The Working Group III contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focused on 450 ppm CO2–eq stabilization 
(studies reported in this category achieved stabilization in a range of 430–480 ppm) and found 
considerably higher mitigation costs in terms of percentage loss in macroeconomic consumption 
(IPCC, 2014). Quoting from the summary for policymakers: 
Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immediately, there is a 
single global carbon tax, and all key technologies are available, have been used as a 
cost-effective benchmark for estimating macroeconomic mitigation costs. Under these 
assumptions, mitigation scenarios that reach atmospheric concentrations of about 
450 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 entail losses in global consumption— not including benefits of 
reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation—of 
1% to 4% (median: 1.7%) in 2030, 2% to 6% (median: 3.4%) in 2050, and 3% to 11% 
(median: 4.8%) in 2100 relative to consumption in baseline scenarios that grows anywhere 
from 300% to more than 900% over the century. 
The technical summary of the IPCC provides cost estimates of stabilization in the range of 
480–530 ppm, more similar to Stern’s range (Edenhofer et al., 2014). The 25–75% likelihood 
cost range for that stabilization level is actually somewhat greater than the 430–480 ppm CO2 
range at about 1.5–3.9% in 2050. The full range was from about 0.5% to over 5%. The top end of 
the even looser target of 530–580 ppm stabilization was even higher, at 11%. The varying ranges 
of cost estimates reflect variation in the sample of models simulating each stabilization level. For 
example, the 530–580 ppm range included results from 46 scenarios from 18 models (that came 
from 11 modeling groups), whereas the 430–480 ppm range included results from only 14 
scenarios from 9 models (that came from 6 modeling groups). Given the broader sample, the full 
range for the 530–580 ppm is probably more representative of the range of disagreement in the 
modeling literature on stabilization costs.  
The IPCC summary statement identifies some assumptions that suggest real costs could be 
higher than estimated: they assume a uniform global carbon tax—a very efficient mechanism for 
reducing emissions; they assume all technologies are available, but in reality alternatives like 
nuclear or carbon capture and storage may face public resistance, limiting availability and raising 
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costs; and they assume all nations participate, with mitigation policies beginning immediately—
but this is certainly not the case especially since, given the publication date of the studies, 
“immediately” meant 2010 or 2015. With delay, sharper cuts are needed, which again would 
likely increase costs. 
On the other hand, despite GHG mitigation costs, the IPCC reports that world economic activity 
grows 3 to 9 times over the century. The costs do not cause a 100-year decline in the economy, but 
instead shave less than a tenth or two from the GDP growth rate: instead of growing at 2.5% per 
year (which would increase economic activity by 9 times over 90 years) the growth rate might fall 
to 2.3 or 2.4% per year (even at the higher end of cost estimates), or if the base growth was 2% per 
year (increasing activity 6 times) then, with mitigation costs, it might fall to 1.8 or 1.9%. 
Nevertheless, the costs at the high end are approaching Stern’s damage estimates, which are 
based on an equal weighting of future and present generations. Given that many of the greater 
damages estimated in the Stern Review are occurring far in the future, the net present value 
percentage consumption loss would be considerably lower for all categories of damages with a 
higher discount rate. The implication would be a more gradual emissions reduction. On the other 
hand, while the IPCC clearly suggests the Stern Review’s cost number was too low, the range in 
the IPCC’s cost estimate is enormous, making it important to try to resolve this wide range.  
Obvious places to look for why the cost range is so large are assumptions about the cost of the 
low-carbon alternative energy sources. That aspect of the problem has been extensively explored 
in global scenarios by the IPCC (Edenhoffer et al., 2014) and in depth for the US in an Energy 
Modeling Forum exercise summarized in Clarke et al. (2015), as well as in many individual 
modeling studies. If costs of alternatives are more expensive or key alternatives are disallowed, 
macroeconomic costs will be higher. As shown in in Clarke et al. (2007), models with relatively 
low future costs delayed abatement with lower near-term costs compared with models that were 
less optimistic about the relative cost of non-fossil and fossil alternatives. While technological 
progress can reduce costs, in some cases early cost estimates may have been overly optimistic. 
For instance, in 2007 constant US dollars, the US Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) 
estimated overnight capital cost of advanced coal with CCS increased from around $3700/KW in 
2010 (EIA, 2010) to nearly $6300/KW in 2015 (EIA, 2015). 
In short, much work has explored the effect of technology cost and policy design. Less work 
has explored the effects of the timing of global policy, so the literature often compares results that 
assumed an optimal abatement trajectory from 2010–2015 to more recent studies, which include a 
later start date. Also underexplored is the structure of macro-energy-economic models. A recent 
exception, Gillingham et al. (2015) conducts a multi-model comparison, assessing uncertainty in 
economic and population growth and climate sensitivity on multiple output variables from a suite 
of integrated assessment models. While the study reveals differences and similarities in results, it 
is not able to isolate how individual structural assumptions in the models affect model results. We 
take a complementary approach with a single macro-energy-economic model, and progressively 
simplify the structure by removing realistic details of the economy that are often not represented 
in simpler energy-economic models. Our energy-economic model is among the more complex 
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models used in integrated assessment. It generates costs on the high end of the IPCC range. We 
conduct two sets of exercises. In the first, we explore the implications of delayed policy adoption; 
in the second, we gradually reduce the complexity of the model structure and analyze how that 
affects mitigation costs. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
alternative model structures and policy timing considered in this study, Section 3 discusses 
simulation design and analyzes results, and Section 4 provides conclusions. 
2. ALTERNATIVE MODEL STRUCTURES AND POLICY TIMING 
We use a recently updated version of the Economic Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) 
model (Chen et al., 2015). It is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world 
economy. CGE modeling has been widely used in various economy-wide analyses such as trade 
liberalization, the interaction between foreign direct investment and trade, optimal taxation, 
modeling of the roles of power sector technologies, and energy and environmental policies 
(Rutherford et al., 1997; Zhou and Latorre, 2014; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; 
Tapia-Ahumada et al., 2015; van der Mensbrugghe, 2010).  
A key element of this class of economic model is a full input-output (I/O) structure of the 
economy: goods produced by one sector may be used in other production sectors as intermediate 
goods, used by consumers and governments as final goods, or used as investment goods or 
exports. Factor inputs and factor markets are explicitly resolved. Multi-regional models include 
trade among regions in goods and services. The macro-economy of EPPA follows these same 
lines, with some unique features. It includes advanced energy conversion technologies and 
accounts for both greenhouse gases and conventional pollutants. In addition to labor and 
produced capital, the model resolves a number of natural resource factors including energy 
resources and land. The version of EPPA used here updates the main economic data of the model 
to the Global Trade Analysis Project Version 8 (GTAP 8) database with a benchmark year of 
2007 (Narayanan et al., 2012). Costs of advanced technologies, pollution inventories, and 
emissions coefficients for carbon and other GHGs are also updated as described in Chen et al. 
(2015). Previous versions of the model are described in Babiker et al. (2001), Paltsev et al. 
(2005), and Reilly et al. (2012). We focus here on those elements of the model that we simplify. 
2.1 Regional and Sectoral Structure 
The model covers all countries of the world in 18 regions. Large economies (United States, 
Canada, Mexico, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, Indonesia, India, Brazil) are each 
represented as separate regions, and smaller economies are aggregated together to form 
geographically contiguous regions such as the European Union, the Middle East, or Africa, as 
shown in Table 1. The regional structure plays a role in our simulations through the inclusion or 
exclusion of tariffs and trade distortions.  
The model includes 18 sectors (see Table 2), with the largest in economic terms for many 
countries being the Other Industries sector. Details in the Agriculture, Energy-Intensive 
Industries, and Transportation sectors are included given the resource focus of the modeling even 
though for most regions they are a small share of output in terms of value added.  
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Table 1. Regions and abbreviations. 
Abbr. Region Abbr. Region Abbr. Region 
USA United States ROE Eastern Europe & Central Asia IND India 
CAN Canada RUS Russia BRA Brazil 
MEX Mexico REA East Asia AFR Africa 
JPN Japan KOR South Korea MES Middle East 
ANZ Australia, New Zealand & Oceania IDZ Indonesia LAM Latin America 
EUR European Union+a CHN China ASI Rest of Asia 
a The European Union (EU-28) plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. 
Table 2. Sectors and abbreviations. 
Abbr. Sector Abbr. Sector Abbr. Sector 
CROP Agriculture - Cropsa ROIL Refined Oil ELEC: hydro Hydro Electricity  
LIVE Agriculture - Livestocka GAS Gas EINT Energy-Intensive Industriesa 
FORS Agriculture - Forestrya ELEC: coal Coal Electricity OTHR Other Industriesa 
FOOD Food Productsa ELEC: gas Gas Electricity DWE Dwellingsa 
COAL Coal ELEC: petro Petroleum Electricity SERV Servicesa 
OIL Crude Oil ELEC: nucl Nuclear Electricity TRAN Commercial Transporta 
a Sectors aggregated together to form a single sector in scenarios showing the effect of aggregation on costs. 
Table 3. Advanced technologies in the energy sector. 
First generation biofuels Advanced gas 
Second generation biofuels Advanced gas w/ CCS 
Oil shale Wind 
Synthetic gas from coal Bio-electricity 
Hydrogen Wind power combined with bio-electricity  
Advanced nuclear Wind power combined with gas-fired power 
Advanced coal w/ CCS Solar generation 
 
We note that with less sectoral resolution, there is implicit substitution among intermediate 
inputs, and we hypothesize that sectoral aggregation would reduce costs by making implicit 
substitution away from energy intensive products like iron and steel, paper, chemicals, and 
cement production easier. To test this hypothesis, we restructure our basic model by combining 
the Agriculture sectors, Food Products, Energy-Intensive, Other, Dwellings, Services and 
Commercial Transport into a single sector with a single industry output. This eliminates all 
non-energy intermediate inputs, and therefore all output goes to final demand (households, 
government, investment, or exports). 
In addition to sectors presented in Table 2, the energy sector is augmented with the inclusion 
of 14 advanced technologies that provide substitutes for conventional (existing) power 
generation, natural gas, petroleum or liquid fuels refined from petroleum (Table 3). These 
advanced technologies remain separately identified in all simulations.  
In our standard specification, coal, gas, and petroleum based electricity generation are 
imperfect substitutes. We simplify this by restructuring different generation types as producing 
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electricity outputs that are perfect substitutes. We maintain constraints on hydro generation 
expansion based on assessment of additional resources that can be developed in each region. We 
assume that existing nuclear capacity and sites can be maintained and relicensed at their current 
marginal production cost, but that any further nuclear expansion in a region must come from 
advanced nuclear, subject to a different cost structure. 
2.2 Capital Vintaging 
In our standard model we include capital vintaging, which captures two important 
inflexibilities: (1) once investment occurs, capital must remain in the sector (or technology) in 
which it was placed until it depreciates; and (2) once built, the ability to substitute among inputs 
is limited. The first inflexibility is often termed irreversibility, and means that once the 
investment is made, future decisions on whether to use it are based only on variable costs. This 
makes it more difficult for advanced technology to capture market share, as the price of output 
from the old technology can drop below full replacement cost—at least until the sunk capital 
depreciates away. The second inflexibility means that if relative prices change or the technology 
improves, the vintaged stock is unable to adjust to these new prices or update to the 
characteristics of the new technology (e.g. higher-efficiency coal power generation). This gives 
less ability to substitute away from a fossil-based input. In our representation, only a portion of 
capital in any sector is vintaged, reflecting that some aspects of a plant’s physical structure or 
siting can be reused, and that plants may be retrofitted to take some advantage of substitution 
possibilities. 
To represent vintaging in the model, capital is divided into two portions: 𝐾𝑀#, in which all 
new investment is malleable, and a vintaged, non-malleable portion 𝑉%,#, where n represents a 
particular vintage category and t represents the time period. Capital is region specific, and 
vintaged capital is sector specific. For simplicity, in the notation we suppress region and sector 
subscripts. For a given time period, 𝑛 = 1 is 5-year-old vintaged capital in a sector and region; 𝑛 = 2 and 𝑛 = 3 are the 10- and 15-year-old vintaged capital, respectively; and 𝑛 = 4 is capital 
older than 20 years. The dynamics of the malleable capital are described by: 𝐾𝑀# = 𝐼𝑁𝑉#/0 + 1 − 𝜃 1 − 𝛿 5𝐾𝑀#/0  (1) 
In Equation (1), 𝜃 is the fraction of the malleable capital that becomes non-malleable at the 
end of period 𝑡 − 1. 𝐼𝑁𝑉#/0 and 𝛿 are the investment and annual depreciation rate, respectively. 
The factor of 5 is used because the model is solved in five-year intervals. The newly formed 
non-malleable capital 𝑉0,# is the fraction, 𝜃, of the surviving malleable capital from the previous 
period: 𝑉0,# = 𝜃 1 − 𝛿 5𝐾𝑀#/0  (2) 
With this structure capital has a lifetime of 25 years, but much capital—especially in the 
power sector and capital intensive industry—survives well beyond 25 years. To accommodate 
this, we slowly depreciate vintage 4 capital, updating its production coefficients in t + 1 to reflect 
the average of undepreciated vintage 4 stock at time t, with the newly added in t + 1 vintage 4 
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stock. We assume that the physical productivity of installed vintage capital does not depreciate 
until it reaches the final vintage. This reflects an assumption that, once in place, a physical plant 
can continue to produce the same level of output without further investment. This is in 
conjunction with the assumption that (1 − 𝜃) of capital remains malleable and depreciates 
continuously. Heuristically, this can be seen as investment in a new physical plant to be part 
vintaged and part malleable, with the regular updates and replacement (short of the long-term 
replacement of a plant) accounted in the depreciation of malleable capital. This process can be 
described by: 𝑉9,#:0 = 𝑉0,#; 	  𝑉=,#:9 = 𝑉9,#:0;	  𝑉>,#:= = 𝑉=,#:9 + 1 − 𝛿 5𝑉>,#:9  (3) 
An implication of this formulation is that old capital can become obsolete if relative prices 
change. Big changes in relative prices—for example, if a high carbon tax is suddenly put in 
place—can push the rental price on old capital to zero, implying that it may cease operation, or 
only operate below full capacity. This reflects realities we see in the electric power sector where 
old, inefficient power plants are often idled except during peak demand periods, or if there are 
requirements or incentives to add renewable capacity when there is little or no demand growth. 
Morris et al. (2014) demonstrate this feature under example simulations.  
Most models looking decades into the future, on the other hand, often assume capital is fully 
malleable without considering vintaging. If the time periods are 10 or 15 years, a policy is 
gradually implemented, and agents have perfect foresight that may not be a bad assumption. 
However, given tight stabilization goals where rapid reduction in emissions is required, this 
assumption means that a coal power plant in period 𝑡 can implicitly become a wind turbine in 
period 𝑡 + 1. In reality, with sunk costs, the coal-fired power plant may continue operating for 
years or decades despite carbon pricing. Advanced technologies must only beat the lower 
marginal variable costs, not the full cost of the replacing the coal power plant. The sunk cost in 
old technology means a higher carbon tax will be required for advanced technologies to build 
early. Put another way, a coal plant prematurely retired will result in lost investment (or stranded 
assets). While vintaging of capital is a standard feature of our model, to examine the 
implications, we will also consider a putty-putty setting with no capital vintaging. 
2.3 Domestic and International Trade Distortions 
In an idealized economy without externalities, economic welfare is optimized when prices 
reflect the marginal cost of producing goods. Taxes imposed to simply raise revenue distort the 
level of economic activities (production, consumption, trade flows, etc.), as opposed to those 
specifically formulated to correct for externalities. Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) pointed out 
that existing tax distortions may exacerbate the welfare loss of an abatement policy. Taking a 
production activity as an example, the distortionary effect of a tax can be shown as a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP). With no tax distortion, the problem is: 𝑀𝐶 − 𝑃 ≥ 0;𝑄 ≥ 0	  ; 𝑀𝐶 − 𝑃	   ∙ 𝑄 = 0  (4) 
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In Problem (4), 𝑀𝐶 and 𝑃 are marginal cost and price, which is the marginal revenue of 
producing 𝑄, respectively. When the output 𝑄 is positive, the marginal cost should equal the 
marginal revenue. When taxes are introduced, the problem becomes: 1 + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝐶 − 1 − 𝑡𝑜 ∙ 𝑃 ≥ 0; 𝑄 ≥ 0	  ; 1 + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝐶 − 1 − 𝑡𝑜 ∙ 𝑃 ∙ 𝑄 = 0  (5) 
In Problem (5), one can think of the tax rates, 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑜, as those levied on the supplier and 
user of the good, respectively. With a positive 𝑡𝑖, producing 𝑄 becomes more expensive. 
Similarly, a positive 𝑡𝑜 makes the output less attractive to the user. In either case, less output 𝑄 
is produced. The same logic applies to a subsidy, which is nothing more than a negative tax. One 
can derive an effective tax rate, 𝑡𝑖G, that combines both 𝑡𝑜 and 𝑡𝑖 by dividing the first inequality 
in Problem (5) by 1 − 𝑡𝑜: 𝑡𝑖G = #H:#I0/#I   (6) 
This simply recognizes that the user price 𝑃 (to which 𝑡𝑜 is applied) includes 𝑀𝐶 ∙ (1 + 𝑡𝑖). 
For most goods and services, the primary tax is an excise (sales or value added) tax—here 
interpretable as a user tax. In the case of inputs such as labor or capital, both the user and the 
supplier may pay a tax. In the US, suppliers of labor pay tax on earned income and toward the 
payroll tax, while employers also pay part of the payroll tax. Similarly, investors (suppliers of 
capital) pay taxes on capital earnings and companies pay a tax on profits. International trade 
distortions enter as tariffs or subsidies on exports (supplier tax) or tariffs on imports (user tax). 
The GTAP data provides sector-specific taxes for all goods, inputs, imports and exports, and 
these are applied in our standard formulation aggregated to the regions and sectors of the model. 
The detailed tax rates are given in the Appendix. For illustrative purposes, Table 4 shows average 
tax rates aggregated to intermediate and final goods, labor, capital, exports and imports. All taxes 
are in terms of a supplier tax, as in Equation (6). The average tax rates presented in the table are 
calculated using the base-year value share of each commodity or input.  
While we are able to use sector-specific rates for all goods and inputs, each is represented as 
an average tax rate for that input or good in that sector. In the case of a flat excise tax, this is 
appropriate. For more complex tax structures (e.g. progressive income taxes), the distortionary 
effect of the tax on an individual depends on the marginal tax rate that person or entity faces. 
Given that the GTAP database only provides average tax rates, we are likely underestimating the 
distortionary interaction effect of carbon pricing and taxes for countries with progressive tax 
rates. Aggregation across countries or sectors would also tend to reduce the distortionary effect. 
Capturing the effect of marginal tax rates requires more structure on household income than we 
have in EPPA. For an example that incorporates US marginal tax rates see Rausch et al. (2011).  
To examine the implications of these tax distortions and possible interactions with mitigation 
policy, we consider alternative model structures that (1) eliminate all domestic tax distortions 
and (2) eliminate all international trade distortions. 
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Table 4. Average percentage tax rates in EPPA. 
Region Intermediate Final L&K Export Import 
USA 2.193 1.589 11.540 0.208 1.064 
CAN 3.290 6.247 11.178 -0.041 1.470 
MEX 1.710 5.842 1.812 -0.007 2.328 
JPN 4.501 2.580 11.708 0.217 1.880 
ANZ 2.987 6.591 3.263 -0.035 2.892 
EUR 4.941 7.879 19.137 0.911 0.618 
ROE 2.043 4.481 3.317 21.976 3.334 
RUS 2.331 6.311 2.233 0.335 7.362 
ASI 0.955 3.325 1.225 4.246 2.715 
CHN 0.278 6.959 -0.004 5.220 7.445 
IND 2.267 2.614 0.058 2.406 11.208 
BRA 1.187 6.491 14.559 0.656 5.356 
AFR 1.695 2.896 1.830 0.026 7.132 
MES 0.976 1.968 2.965 0.373 4.676 
LAM 2.290 6.457 3.608 0.306 5.585 
REA 2.112 3.570 1.168 -0.007 8.475 
KOR 6.466 0.734 2.647 0.820 6.239 
IDZ -0.012 3.557 1.057 0.000 3.291 
 
2.4 Structure of the Electricity Sector 
We use Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions (and the special cases 
of Leontief and Cobb-Douglas functions) throughout our standard model formulation. We 
overcome the restriction that all pairs of inputs have identical elasticities of substitution by 
creating a nest structure. Figure 1 illustrates the nest structure for fossil-based electricity 
generation. Each nest can have an elasticity of substitution that applies to input pairs within that 
nest. As discussed above, these elasticities apply to production from malleable capital. Once 
vintaged, elasticities of substitution are zero. The production technology in the model is 
represented by a cost function based on the duality theorem. Taking the fossil-based power 
sector aggregation as an example, the index for the marginal cost of the aggregated output, 
denoted by 𝐶, can be expressed as: 𝐶 = 𝛼K 𝑝𝑑𝑐/𝑝𝑑𝑐 0/P + 𝛼Q 𝑝𝑑𝑔/𝑝𝑑𝑔 0/P + 𝛼I 𝑝𝑑𝑜/𝑝𝑑𝑜 0/P 0/(0/P)  (7) 
where 𝛼K, 𝛼Q, and 𝛼I are the value shares for coal-fired, gas-fired, and oil-fired generation 
technologies, and 𝑝𝑑𝑐, 𝑝𝑑𝑔, and 𝑝𝑑𝑜 are price indices for coal-fired, gas-fired, and oil-fired 
generation options, respectively. The bar over each price index denotes the benchmark value. 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution on the top nest, which is denoted by 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 in Figure 1. 
Vintaged production for each generation technology has a different sub-nest. The output from 
vintage production is homogenous to that from malleable production of that generation type, 
which means both outputs have the same price index. While Equation (7) is for the top nest CES, 
other sub-nests are formulated in the same fashion. 
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Figure 1. Production structure for fossil-based generation.1  
The structure of Equation (7) means that electricity from oil, gas, or coal are imperfect 
substitutes for one another. While electricity from any generation type is indistinguishable, the 
intuition for imperfect substitution is that different generation forms play different roles in 
supplying base, shoulder and peak loads. The lower fuel cost and higher capital costs of coal 
generation, and penalties associated with ramping it, make it a more likely option for base load 
generation. Gas generation can have lower capital costs and a higher fuel cost, and it can be 
ramped more quickly; therefore, it is often preferred for providing peak capacity or adding 
flexibility for periods that require rapid ramping. The imperfect substitution can also indirectly 
capture differences in prices of fuels within a region. Within our model formulation there is a 
single price for refined oil, gas, or coal used in electricity in each region. In reality, generation 
located near a coal mine mouth or natural gas field may face much lower prices than in the rest of 
the region. To the extent that the mix of generation types in the base data reflect these 
intra-regional differences, one might expect stickiness in substitution as relative prices change. The 
share-preserving nature of the CES production allows some—but not complete—substitution 
toward the generation type whose relative cost drops. Econometric studies find generally low 
substitution elasticities among fuels in electric generation, supporting this characterization. 
While there is a logic for and evidence of imperfect substitution among generation types, over 
the long term with bigger relative prices changes this approach may unduly constrain the ability 
to substitute among generation types. Thus, we restructure the model so that the three fossil 
generation types are perfect substitutes.  
2.5 Policy Timing and Discount Rates 
Many of the results in the literature assume that a global climate policy would begin in the 
next year or two from the start of the research. Often by the time the research is published and 
                                                
 
1 𝑝𝑑 is the price index for aggregated fossil-based generation; 𝑝𝑑𝑐, 𝑝𝑑𝑔, and 𝑝𝑑𝑜 are price indices for coal-fired, 
gas-fired, and oil-fired generation; 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑔ℎ𝑔, 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑏, and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛 are price indices for CO2 emissions, non-CO2 
GHGs, urban pollutants, and the price index for paying the renewable credit, respectively; 𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑎𝑖_𝑐, and 𝑝𝑎𝑓_𝑔 
are price indices for various Armington goods; 𝑝𝑙 and 𝑝𝑘 are prices of labor and capital. The elasticity on the top 
of each nest is presented with both the notation and value. 
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finds its way into a review, the start date of the policy is already history. We start an “optimal” 
global path to stabilization in years ranging from 2010 to 2030, which allows for at least an 
heuristic update of older studies. This update is necessary given that near-term policy appears to 
have been set in place through 2025 or 2030 (based on the outcome of recent international 
negotiations—see Jacoby and Chen, 2015; Reilly et al., 2015); additionally, given those policies, 
likely emissions pathways remain well above two-degree stabilization. The optimal stabilization 
path we consider is represented by imposing a uniform global carbon tax that rises at a specified 
discount rate over time. When the policy is delayed, a higher starting carbon tax will be needed 
to meet a given carbon budget. Lowering the discount rate (while keeping other things equal) 
will also necessitate a higher initial carbon tax, as it requires more near-term reduction. While in 
most exercises we use a discount rate of 4%, we also present results under different reduction 
paths based on various discount rates. 
Finally, another subtle difference in comparison among studies is the discount rate. In 
forward-looking general equilibrium models, the discount rate is endogenous and depends on the 
pure rate of time preference and the growth rate of the economy. In our recursive-dynamic 
formulation, we apply an exogenous discount rate. As applied it has two effects. First, since we 
simulate a price path that rises at the discount rate, the price path and timing of emissions 
reductions are affected. A higher discount rate means a lower initial carbon price and less early 
abatement, with a more steeply rising rate and more abatement in later periods. Second, the net 
present value cost calculation is directly affected by the choice of discount rate. 
3. SIMULATION DESIGN AND RESULTS 
3.1 Simulation Design 
We simulate a stabilization scenario under different policy scenarios and model structures. 
The first year of the model run is 2007, which is the base year of GTAP 8 (Narayanan et al., 
2012), the main economic database of our model. Starting from 2010, the model solves in 5-year 
intervals. The projected global GDP of our model in 2100 under the reference scenario is around 
7.5 times higher than the 2010 level, while the corresponding cumulative emissions from 2010 to 
2100 is about 5100 GtCO2. Because international negotiations focus on a 2°C warming target, 
we develop policy scenarios consistent with meeting that target. We follow Sokolov et al. (2015) 
and target a cumulative carbon budget of 900 GtC (3300 GtCO2) emitted from 1870 through 
2100. This carbon budget is consistent with CO2 concentrations of 480–530 ppm by the end of 
the 21st century, corresponding to a 50% chance of meeting a 2°C target (IPCC, 2014). As in the 
IPCC (2014), we impose a uniform carbon tax across regions to ensure the budget is met. Other 
non-CO2 GHGs are priced similarly based on their global warming potential (GWP) levels. 
We consider two sets of exercises: (1) exploring policy timing by shifting the start of the 
policy from 2010 to 2030 in 5-year increments; and (2) stripping away, one-by-one, complexities 
in our economic model to see how those changes affect estimated macroeconomic costs. 
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3.2 The Effect of Policy Timing on Stabilization Costs 
Scenarios with varying timing of the start of the stabilization scenario are listed in Table 5. 
These simulations are conducted with the standard model formulation. By assumption the carbon 
tax rises at an annual rate of 4%, simulating optimal timing of reductions for an assumed 
discount rate of 4%. To achieve the aforementioned carbon budget, the required initial CO2 tax 
(in constant 2010 US dollars) is $47/tCO2 if the policy could have started in 2010, and it more 
than triples to $154/tCO2 if the policy implementation is delayed to 2030 (Figure 2).  
The imposition of the significant carbon tax results in an immediate sharp reduction in 
emissions in the year in which it is implemented (Figure 3). For instance, the initial reduction is 
7.9 Gt, 9.2 Gt, 12.8 Gt, 16.8 Gt, and 21.8 Gt for a policy start date of 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025, 
and 2030, respectively. 
Although countries have agreed to policies and measures designed to reduce emissions from a 
business-as-usual projection, evaluation of these proposed policies suggest that global emissions 
would continue to rise through 2030 to 37 GtCO2 by one estimate (Reilly et al., 2015). While 
somewhat below the 46.5 Gt in 2030 in the reference scenario, it is far above the roughly 
23 GtCO2 that would be consistent with an optimal carbon tax. 
Table 5. Scenarios varying the policy start date. 
Policy Scenario Policy Start Annual Discount Rate 
S2010_D4  2010 4% 
S2015_D4 2015 4% 
S2020_D4 2020 4% 
S2025_D4 2025 4% 
S2030_D4 2030 4% 
 
 
Figure 2. Initial carbon taxes for scenarios with various policy timings. 
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Figure 3. Global CO2 emissions with various policy timings. 
 
 
Figure 4. Costs of policies in 2030, 2050, 2100 with various policy timings. NPV shows the net present 
value of the cost over 2010–2100. 
The economic cost results reveal that delaying the abatement policy would substantially 
increase the mitigation costs (Figure 4). For instance, if the policy were postponed to 2030, 
compared to the scenario where the policy starts from 2010, the mitigation costs in 2050 and 
2100 would rise by 52.0% and 26.4%, respectively, and the present value of the cost for the time 
period 2010–2100 would increase by nearly 29%, from a 3.3% loss of consumption to 4.4%.  
3.3 Results with Alternative Model Structures 
Table 6 presents model structure variants developed for the second exercise. For these 
scenarios we begin with the optimal policy starting in 2020. We replace price targets by emission 
caps for each model period and each region equal to the level of emissions achieved in the BASE 
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scenario in each period, where a starting CO2 price equal to $80 per ton was required to meet the 
cumulative emissions target. This ensures that the same level of emissions is achieved in all 
cases. Given the structural changes across scenarios, we expect that a fixed carbon tax would 
give a different (and likely greater) level of abatement as we strip away complexities.  
The alternative model structures yield somewhat different business-as-usual emissions 
(Figure 5). Removing the vintaging structure slightly decreases the emission levels because 
older capital is less energy efficient than newer capital. Eliminating tax distortions, on the other 
hand, increases economic output and emissions. Sectoral aggregation does not substantially 
change the emissions profile. Stripping off the CES structure for conventional fossil generation 
facilitates the switch from coal to gas, whose driving factors include the cost for coal-fired power 
considered in the model (Chen et al., 2015). The easier coal-to-gas switch explains why global 
emissions under this setting are the lowest up to the middle of the century. Removal of the CES 
structure then results in higher emissions for later years. This is because without the CES 
structure, the flexibility to switch to the least-cost generation source is increased. This leads to 
more gas generation, lower electricity prices, and eventually substantial increase in electricity 
use and generation. Thus, in later years, even with less coal and more gas use, CO2 emissions are 
ultimately higher without the CES structure. 
Table 6. Alternative model structures. 
Scenario Structural Setting 
BASE Base parameterization of EPPA6 
NV BASE + vintaging removed 
NVD NV + domestic tax distortion removed 
NVT NVD + all other tax distortions removed 
AGG-NVT NVT + an aggregated non-fossil and non-electricity sector 
AGGE-NVT AGG-NVT + perfect substitution among fossil generation options 
 
 
Figure 5. Global reference CO2 emissions with various model settings. 
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When the emissions reduction policy is imposed, regardless of model complexities, emissions 
are invariant by design under the considered emission cap, yielding the same emissions as those 
under the price target scenario S2020_D4 (Table 5). The results with alternative model structural 
settings show that taking out the vintaging structure reduces net present value costs by 18% (from 
4.4 to 3.6%), with the biggest reductions earlier in the century (Figure 6). Removing domestic tax 
distortions lower the costs by another 14% (from 3.6 to 3.1%), and removing international tax 
distortions reduces the NPV cost by another 7% (from 3.1 to 2.9%). Again, the cost reductions are 
greatest earlier in the century. Sectoral aggregation eliminates the interdependency between the 
disaggregated sectors, and thus makes it easier to cut emissions, reducing the net present value cost 
by another 28% (from 2.9 to 2.1%). Removing the CES structure used in conventional fossil 
generations further reduces the NPV cost by 10% (from 2.1 to 1.9%). However, while nearer-term 
costs are lower in this case, longer-term costs are higher. This higher cost can be traced to the 
higher projected business-as-usual emissions in later years (Figure 5).  
Altogether, incorporating economic realities such as limited generation substitution in 
electricity, sectoral disaggregation, domestic and international distortions and capital asset fixity 
more than doubles the estimated macroeconomic cost of the stabilization policy we implement 
here, increasing net present value costs over the period through 2100 from 1.9% to 4.4%.  
3.4 Results with Various Discount Rates 
As previously noted, different discount rate assumptions can also lead to different costs and 
time paths of emissions. In this final set of simulations, we again generate optimal stabilization 
price paths for discount rates of 2, 3, 4, and 5%—a range that reflect different views on the 
underlying risk free market return on investment. This range includes the IPCC’s standard 5% 
discount rate assumption (Table SPM2 in IPCC, 2014). Since the IPCC generally uses much 
more simplified macroeconomic models, to compare our results we simulate these scenarios with 
the most simplified model structure that we developed in the preceding section (AGGE-NVT). 
Starting the policy in 2020, under each discount rate regime, we “re-optimize” the carbon price 
path for AGGE-NVT by finding a new uniform initial price with the goal of meeting a carbon 
budget consistent with the 480–530 ppm target. As hypothesized, the higher the initial discount 
rate, the lower the initial carbon price (Figure 8). At a discount rate of 5% a price of $52/tCO2 is 
required, and at 2% this rises to $184/tCO2. 
In terms of the net present value cost of the policies, the AGGE-NVT structure using a 5% 
discount rate generates an identical 2.2% NPV cost of the policy that we estimate for the IPCC. 
While the NPV costs are identical, the IPCC time paths vary from our estimate (Figure 7). The 
median mitigation costs (in terms of the aggregated consumption) the IPCC reported are −1.7%, −2.7%, and −4.7% for 2030, 2050, 2100, with the corresponding ranges for the 16th to 84th 
percentile being [−0.60%, −2.14%], [−1.48%, −4.17%] and [−2.44%, −10.55%], 
respectively (IPCC, 2014). For this case, our estimates for 2030, 2050, and 2100 are 0.8, 2.1, and 
9.7%, respectively—lower than the IPCC estimates for early years and rising above their median 
estimate in the second half of the century. 
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Figure 6. Costs of policies in 2030, 2050 and 2100 with various model settings. NPV shows the net present value of 
the cost over 2010–2100. 
 
 
Figure 7. Initial carbon taxes for scenarios with various discount rates. 
 
 
Figure 8. Costs of policies in 2030, 2050, and 2100 with various discount rates. NPV shows the net present value of 
the cost over 2010–2100, discounted in each scenario at the same rate assumed for the price path. The IPCC 
AR5 did not report NPV costs for the century. We interpolated from the reported results to estimate an NPV 
value for the IPPC summary costs. Additionally, while the IPCC used a 5% discount rate in some calculations, 
the modeling groups summarized in Table SPM2 (IPCC, 2014) likely used a range of discount rates. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The wide range of cost estimates for stabilizing climate is puzzling to policy makers as well 
as researchers. Assumptions about technology costs and the efficiency of the policy instrument 
used to reduce emissions are obvious candidates for explaining cost differences, and these have 
been explored extensively in the literature. The starting time of a global policy and discount rate 
for the optimal path of abatement may also affect costs. Different models make different 
assumptions about the discount rate, and studies done years ago (or those which optimistically 
assume the immediate adoption of a strong global policy) may generate a wider range of costs. 
This contributes to a puzzling range of results in the literature.  
An additional source of cost differences is the complexity (or realism) of the simulated 
economy in which energy investment and other greenhouse gas abatement decisions are made. 
The economics literature strongly indicates that capital vintaging (i.e. irreversibilities in 
investment decisions), interaction with domestic and international tax distortions, the complex 
interdependency among sectors of the economy, and complexities within the electricity sector 
would likely reduce the flexibility of agents responding to a carbon price, and hence increase 
costs of abatement. Global models able to simulate global policies that meet IPCC review criteria 
generally do not include these complexities. This study illustrates that models that lack the 
complexities of a real economy likely underestimate mitigation costs.  
When we simulate a model structured to eliminate complexities of the economic system using 
a timing and discount rate similar to those assumed in the IPCC, we find that our net present 
value cost of achieving a 2°C target is identical to the median estimate of the IPCC (at 2.2%). 
Notably, this is more than twice the cost estimated in the Stern Review. This may reflect, in part, 
that the Stern Review is now 10 years old, and studies reviewed at that time likely assumed the 
global policy would start in 2010 or earlier. By our estimate, if we could have started a global 
policy in 2010, the cost would be 8% less than if started in 2020 compared to our base policy 
runs. Unfortunately, while international negotiations have made progress in getting commitments 
from countries to abate, those commitments are insufficient to drive emissions down, which we 
find an optimal policy would do immediately upon implementation. Hence, if we are able to 
eventually get on an optimal path of emissions abatement toward the 2°C target, it will likely not 
be until 2030 or later, further increasing the costs. Our estimate is that delaying the start to 2030 
would increase the cost by another 14%.  
Finally, we find that including more realistic complexities of world economies with our 
standard model formulation explains why our costs are more than twice the median estimate of the 
IPCC. The economic cost of unabated climate change has proven very difficult to estimate, but the 
risks are significant. Warming of several degrees would eventually lead to meters of sea level rise 
and inundate many coastal cities. This effect of unabated global warming alone seems enough to 
justify the costs of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions—even with higher estimated costs. These 
higher cost estimates do not justify a less-stringent abatement policy; instead, they highlight the 
need to design the most efficient policies possible—with special concern for the costs imposed 
both on lower-income economies and low-income households in economies everywhere. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. The average tax rate of intermediate consumption by sector. 
Unit:% CROP	   LIVE	   FORS	   FOOD	   COAL	   OIL	   ROIL	   GAS	   ELEC	   EINT	   OTHR	   SERV	   TRAN	   DWE	  
USA -2.95 -3.24 5.91 0.99 9.55 4.81 2.70 4.06 4.72 2.02 0.83 2.13 6.17 20.30 
CAN 0.48 0.18 3.50 0.61 2.19 0.96 0.29 1.50 5.67 3.22 1.67 3.30 19.92 19.38 
MEX -13.20 -6.61 0.00 0.20 0.72 141.84 0.02 101.59 -0.13 0.38 0.31 0.69 0.05 0.00 
JPN -2.10 1.71 0.17 10.64 0.00 0.00 49.10 1.94 6.30 4.18 1.47 1.23 8.06 5.34 
ANZ -3.93 -3.15 1.20 3.40 19.80 21.33 -0.74 9.41 4.32 3.61 3.93 2.38 3.39 1.49 
EUR 1.00 -1.53 2.14 6.12 -26.39 2.84 29.17 4.16 8.15 5.54 3.69 1.42 17.44 -0.05 
ROE 4.35 1.15 9.02 1.93 -3.25 0.36 -7.34 24.27 -4.40 3.84 -2.27 2.45 19.89 -1.84 
RUS -6.63 -3.14 2.74 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 28.09 4.29 0.76 0.70 2.95 0.00 
ASI 0.66 1.03 -1.15 1.32 0.00 2.94 0.10 1.65 3.76 1.07 0.30 1.59 2.28 2.66 
CHN -1.84 -0.46 0.52 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 3.70 0.55 0.09 0.17 1.01 0.00 
IND -5.89 2.69 6.54 4.20 0.75 0.68 0.33 0.38 -1.69 4.85 1.50 -0.38 9.91 0.11 
BRA -4.43 -0.60 0.72 1.03 0.91 0.47 0.44 0.46 6.64 2.24 1.00 0.98 3.87 0.09 
AFR 0.46 1.16 0.88 0.61 0.76 0.97 5.88 2.00 1.93 0.97 1.54 1.52 4.70 0.35 
MES 1.30 0.95 3.03 1.83 1.06 0.74 0.58 0.04 3.46 0.82 0.32 0.73 3.64 0.06 
LAM 3.38 1.61 2.05 1.70 0.79 1.47 -3.54 7.48 5.91 2.80 1.74 2.12 9.04 2.67 
REA 0.71 0.32 2.28 1.17 1.93 11.29 0.22 8.01 11.57 4.17 0.11 2.11 7.08 0.62 
KOR -4.69 0.66 1.57 15.24 -39.68 0.00 35.83 4.96 12.28 2.79 3.60 4.67 2.81 3.85 
IDZ 0.09 0.55 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.67 -5.57 0.01 0.05 0.04 1.13 0.00 
* Each sector may have different input tax rates for various inputs. The average rate is calculated based on input 
value shares. 
Table A2. Tax rates on final consumption by sector. 
Unit:% CROP	   LIVE	   FORS	   FOOD	   COAL	   OIL	   ROIL	   GAS	   ELEC	   EINT	   OTHR	   SERV	   TRAN	   DWE	  
USA 5.34 3.15 2.91 9.76 5.88 0.00 26.24 2.32 3.15 6.05 7.78 0.53 0.00 0.00 
CAN -1.61 -1.26 3.37 34.50 54.42 7.24 66.78 14.48 12.17 19.46 20.38 3.14 0.00 -0.16 
MEX 0.13 0.08 0.00 9.12 0.00 0.00 28.30 38.12 12.65 13.75 25.37 2.16 0.00 0.00 
JPN 4.89 4.76 4.97 4.98 0.00 0.00 68.57 23.71 8.25 4.94 4.89 2.21 4.99 0.00 
ANZ 4.07 1.42 5.69 26.68 12.09 0.00 82.24 2.97 10.18 14.03 14.46 4.64 0.00 1.71 
EUR -0.78 7.18 11.57 17.04 52.47 23.34 125.89 56.43 36.08 16.59 18.50 3.97 -0.08 4.32 
ROE 0.81 1.11 0.76 7.94 27.07 47.31 118.20 23.57 16.34 1.85 4.53 1.14 0.54 -1.50 
RUS 4.24 3.96 6.88 34.84 67.29 0.00 17.18 -16.00 2.21 25.82 13.79 -0.74 0.00 0.00 
ASI 1.41 1.68 2.61 7.71 0.00 9.87 18.05 8.71 4.58 2.54 4.85 2.36 -1.01 2.89 
CHN 0.41 0.21 4.58 12.27 17.82 0.00 12.18 -0.01 6.82 11.15 8.83 5.67 8.49 15.29 
IND -3.13 0.10 0.35 3.55 2.20 0.00 79.09 -3.68 -11.31 9.54 4.70 0.54 -1.23 0.00 
BRA 9.80 4.78 6.68 15.17 0.00 0.00 94.17 34.33 23.51 18.70 18.34 3.15 0.00 0.00 
AFR 0.36 0.85 1.21 7.10 -0.01 0.82 27.86 -16.01 3.22 5.03 4.78 1.73 0.12 0.06 
MES 0.13 1.20 3.50 2.80 1.13 0.19 8.45 8.01 2.12 1.73 2.53 1.60 3.08 0.44 
LAM 5.09 2.63 2.85 13.40 22.79 19.00 58.16 22.47 22.03 10.49 14.66 3.00 0.00 0.10 
REA 1.22 0.36 0.25 7.90 5.43 14.19 21.31 19.50 3.66 8.15 5.09 1.14 0.42 0.21 
KOR 0.00 0.06 0.01 1.48 0.00 0.00 77.11 55.49 0.00 0.39 1.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IDZ 1.36 1.19 3.42 8.23 0.00 0.00 4.54 -0.90 0.36 4.20 5.20 2.93 0.00 0.89 
* The tax rate of final consumption is the average of private and public consumption calculated based on the value 
shares.  
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Table A3. Tax rates on labor income by sector. 
Unit:% CROP	   LIVE	   FORS	   FOOD	   COAL	   OIL	   ROIL	   GAS	   ELEC	   EINT	   OTHR	   SERV	   TRAN	   DWE	  
USA 7.67 8.13 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 15.06 
CAN -1.95 1.69 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 16.04 
MEX 1.88 0.86 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 
JPN 11.77 14.32 18.48 18.48 0.00 0.00 18.48 18.48 18.48 18.48 18.48 18.48 18.48 18.48 
ANZ -0.21 0.76 3.44 3.41 4.17 4.02 3.66 3.79 3.78 3.74 3.93 3.87 3.87 4.45 
EUR 19.21 15.67 35.97 35.96 38.36 24.65 32.10 30.97 37.50 37.96 37.39 36.23 35.07 28.82 
ROE 3.22 7.22 5.74 5.66 14.99 7.15 12.15 9.79 15.80 6.62 6.21 5.01 7.10 9.48 
RUS 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 0.00 
ASI 1.17 0.95 1.38 1.33 1.45 1.39 1.71 1.44 1.39 1.70 1.60 1.62 1.49 1.57 
CHN 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.94 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.25 0.00 
IND 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
BRA 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 25.91 
AFR 2.09 2.24 1.89 2.25 2.98 2.23 2.78 1.32 2.61 2.71 2.53 2.56 2.63 2.00 
MES 7.85 6.28 6.72 5.61 8.46 2.22 3.61 6.83 10.91 7.31 6.12 7.09 6.65 13.56 
LAM 5.23 5.07 4.50 5.11 0.91 5.25 5.93 8.81 4.33 5.30 4.98 5.94 5.77 8.22 
REA 1.30 1.05 1.54 1.12 1.29 1.67 0.75 0.62 1.27 1.24 1.18 1.17 1.58 2.28 
KOR -2.90 -1.08 4.96 4.96 4.96 0.00 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 
IDZ 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 
 
Table A4. Tax rates on capital income by sector. 
Unit:% CROP	   LIVE	   FORS	   FOOD	   COAL	   OIL	   ROIL	   GAS	   ELEC	   EINT	   OTHR	   SERV	   TRAN	   DWE	  
USA -4.79 -2.60 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 
CAN -17.42 -10.06 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 
MEX -13.02 -28.94 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
JPN -6.62 -1.32 3.18 3.18 0.00 0.00 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 
ANZ -1.85 -1.64 0.86 2.14 3.14 2.80 2.68 2.84 2.36 2.23 2.61 2.45 2.53 2.81 
EUR -24.10 -31.54 1.63 2.03 1.29 2.49 1.68 2.21 2.03 1.83 1.93 2.05 1.91 2.16 
ROE -4.61 -12.39 1.23 1.23 1.64 1.66 1.01 2.41 0.68 1.18 1.20 1.18 1.16 1.20 
RUS -3.05 1.47 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 0.00 
ASI 0.60 0.41 0.46 0.44 0.28 0.49 0.86 0.40 0.85 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.89 1.43 
CHN -13.35 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.94 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.25 0.25 0.15 
IND 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
BRA -0.02 -0.96 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
AFR 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.24 1.71 1.35 0.66 0.81 0.96 1.38 1.06 1.37 1.22 1.41 
MES 0.98 1.03 0.95 0.97 0.52 1.05 1.23 1.14 1.00 1.59 1.52 1.31 1.23 1.32 
LAM 1.24 0.98 1.01 0.85 0.64 0.85 1.29 1.18 0.68 0.85 1.05 1.23 1.24 0.94 
REA 0.96 0.99 1.75 0.89 1.56 1.44 0.70 1.71 0.86 0.85 1.25 1.03 1.20 1.31 
KOR -13.82 -8.01 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
IDZ 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 
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Table A5. The average export tax rates by sector. 
Unit:% CROP	   LIVE	   FOOD	   COAL	   OIL	   ROIL	   GAS	   EINT	   OTHR	  
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.38 0.01 0.31 0.30 
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.90 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 
MEX -0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ANZ 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 0.59 11.86 0.71 0.13 0.09 
EUR -0.05 -0.17 -0.61 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROE 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 7.83 0.01 0.92 1.01 
RUS 0.00 0.62 0.00 1.04 37.00 18.67 95.43 5.78 5.41 
ASI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.43 1.66 3.81 0.11 0.32 
CHN 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.96 14.01 4.98 0.00 4.29 5.31 
IND 0.00 0.32 0.00 -0.01 0.00 20.53 0.00 11.04 3.90 
BRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 3.32 0.00 3.80 4.15 
AFR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.48 3.11 -0.39 0.76 1.77 
MES 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LAM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 4.27 0.21 0.07 0.10 
REA -0.09 -0.88 0.00 0.61 1.55 -0.48 4.00 1.40 -0.09 
KOR -7.01 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IDZ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.51 0.28 0.35 1.11 1.23 
* An export tax rate may vary across export destinations. The average rate is calculated using the export value 
share of each destination region.  
Table A6. Tax rates on imports by sector. 
Unit:% CROP	   LIVE	   FORS	   FOOD	   COAL	   OIL	   ROIL	   GAS	   ELEC	   EINT	   OTHR	  
USA 2.18 0.23 0.19 3.08 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.98 1.57 
CAN 0.22 7.41 0.02 16.84 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.47 1.29 
MEX 5.52 0.60 1.19 3.18 0.01 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.03 1.57 3.10 
JPN 12.60 4.31 0.11 19.62 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.72 1.30 
ANZ 0.96 0.54 0.31 3.63 0.00 0.00 2.63 0.00 0.00 2.12 4.72 
EUR 2.47 1.22 0.06 3.56 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.83 
ROE 13.79 4.34 0.80 14.40 0.06 1.81 1.18 1.03 0.97 2.94 3.82 
RUS 5.72 6.22 7.29 17.72 0.14 0.02 3.97 0.06 0.00 8.13 8.26 
ASI 7.12 3.99 2.18 10.71 0.37 0.72 1.76 0.04 0.00 4.07 2.94 
CHN 9.08 13.38 0.44 8.36 2.91 0.20 4.57 0.00 0.00 22.92 3.81 
IND 45.48 12.78 6.33 78.28 31.40 9.94 13.83 9.43 0.00 14.93 10.42 
BRA 1.97 2.77 3.20 6.15 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 6.75 9.97 
AFR 10.65 8.99 6.65 17.17 2.46 1.24 6.81 0.00 0.16 7.21 8.66 
MES 5.61 1.90 4.65 13.01 0.13 0.05 4.11 2.00 0.33 4.89 6.12 
LAM 7.10 3.34 3.94 11.60 2.10 2.01 4.78 0.03 0.00 4.86 7.60 
REA 7.56 4.24 3.79 14.55 5.23 4.03 11.49 0.00 0.70 6.65 11.51 
KOR 208.92 11.76 0.22 30.41 0.00 2.99 4.40 2.28 0.00 3.36 3.84 
IDZ 2.37 2.93 1.33 9.02 0.00 0.14 1.74 0.00 0.00 4.54 4.20 
* An import tax rate may vary across origins. The average rate is calculated using the import value share of each 
origin region. 
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